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 Abstract 
 
Flood events are expected to increase in frequency and severity as climate change raises sea 
levels and intensifies regional precipitation events. The only permanent means of removing high 
risk homes from flood prone areas is through homeowner buyout programs. Using an online 
contingent valuation survey we evaluate homeowner willingness to pay for a pre-flood buyout 
agreement where the owner is paid pre-flood market value for their home and must relocate 
following a flood damaging greater than 50% of the value of their home. Additionally, we 
estimate homeowners’ willingness to sign up for a pre-flood buyout agreement coupled with 
flood insurance. We find self-reported flood risk estimates, income, the expectation of neighbors 
also signing up for the buyout, environmental concerns, and flood experience all significantly 
affect homeowners’ willingness to pay for the program. When coupled with flood insurance we 
find self-reported flood risk estimates, income, neighborhood tenure, environmental concerns, 
and flood experience all significantly affect homeowners’ willingness to sign up. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Much attention has been paid to the rising public costs of the National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP). In conjunction with subsidized1 insurance premiums, which leave the price of 
some policies below their risk adjusted value (Kousky & Shabman 2014; Hayes & Neal 2011), 
high profile flood events caused by Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Sandy and a number of riverine 
inundations have highlighted the economic costs of floods2. Premiums collected from flood 
insurance policies have fallen far short of covering the losses of these major flood events; thus, 
the NFIP carries a $23 billion debt burden (GAO 2016). Policymakers are debating how best to 
manage flood risk in the future and limit taxpayer financial exposure to NFIP losses. This paper 
will examine a possible new kind of policy: a pre-flood buyout agreement between flood 
management agencies and homeowners. Under such an agreement the homeowner would remain 
in their home until a flood event causes damage greater than 50% of the value of the home 
(substantial damage). Following such an event, the homeowner would be paid the pre-flood 
market value of the property to move, the home would be razed, the land restored to a natural 
state or public space, and the property would no longer be a liability to the NFIP.  We estimate 
the welfare effects of such a policy on flood plain homeowners by quantifying their willingness 
to pay to take part in such a program. We identify how preferences over such policies vary with 
factors such as income, race, and connection to the community; social justice issues are 
                                                                 
1 Subsidized policies are defined as a category of business that does not make an adequate contribution to the loss 
reserve pool (Hayes & Neal 2011) 
2 These major flood events have also accentuated the human, and environmental costs of development in flood prone 
areas (National Research Council 2014; Dalbom 2014; Gedan et al. 2011; Mcleman & Hunter 2009) 
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prominent concerns in flood policy design. We also develop an estimate of the fraction of flood 
plain homeowners who would be willing to take part in a particular buyout program, coupled 
with flood insurance, that has been proposed in the literature (Hayat & Moore 2015).  
Flood losses have consistently imposed the highest economic costs of any natural 
disasters (King 2012).  Eighty-eight percent of U.S. counties experienced at least one flood in the 
last half of the 20th century (Burby 2001). Moving forward, flood events are expected to increase 
in frequency and severity as climate change raises sea levels and intensifies regional 
precipitation events (Galloway et al. 2006; Pachauri & Meyer 2014; Mallakpour & Villarini 
2015). Additionally, the U.S. population is disproportionately living in higher risk areas. Thirty-
nine percent of the U.S. population lives in costal shoreline counties which represent only 10% 
of the U.S. land area (excluding Alaska) and the rate of population density increase is greatest for 
costal shoreline counties (NOAA 2013).  
The high costs of disaster recovery from floods stems in part from the subsidized 
premium policies that have existed since the inception of the National Flood Insurance Program. 
These subsidized policies were intended to encourage participation in the program, but 
consequently boosted development in high risk areas (Wriggins 2014; Bagstad et al. 2006) by 
subsidizing the long term cost of development. Housing affordability concerns have countered 
attempts to reduce or eliminate premium subsidies.  
Many other factors contribute to rising costs of flood recovery including low flood 
insurance market penetration rates, out of date flood maps, coastal population growth, and 
political issues.  On average, only 50% of properties in high risk areas are covered by flood 
insurance (Dixon & Clancy 2006; Kriesel & Landry 2004).  NFIP Flood Insurance Rate Maps 
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(FIRMs)3 are commonly a decade or more out of date and are based on past flood experience 
rather than future flood risk, which is likely to change due to climate change (Galloway et al. 
2006; Carolan 2007). Population growth within coastal counties has outpaced non-coastal 
counties, with shoreline counties adding 125 persons per square mile compared to 36 persons per 
square miles for all U.S. counties between 1970 and 2010, (NOAA 2013). Finally, policy makers 
receive more electoral support when directing post-disaster spending when compared to pre-
disaster spending. Healy and Malhotra (2009) find elected officials are more likely to be re-
elected for disaster relief spending when compared to disaster preparedness spending, even 
though they estimate $1 spent on preparedness is worth about $15 in future savings from 
mitigated floods (assuming a 4% discount rate and a 6% depreciation rate). Additionally, Conrad 
et al. (1998) finds a 200% return on disaster preparation spending within 5 years4 
The role of the federal government in the flood insurance market emerged from failure of 
private insurers’ ability to cover large spatially correlated flood events in the early 1960s 
(Kousky & Michel-Kerjan 2015; Kunreuther 2015). With its creation in 1976, the NFIP became 
the primary flood risk management tool for the U.S. government, encouraging participation by 
offering insurance at subsidized rates in exchange for risk mitigation requirements from 
participating communities.  Calls for more flood insurance reform stem from a combination of 
unprecedented borrowing from the U.S. Treasury due to high loss ratios, a low probability of 
                                                                 
3 Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM) delineate flood zones, provide a basis to identify properties that require flood 
insurance, and establish where floodplain building standards should be enforced (GAO 2015). The Technical 
Mapping Advisory Council (TMAC), created and funded under Biggert Waters is tasked with reviewing, updating, 
and maintaining rate maps 
4 Conrad et al. 1998 did not account for additional cost savings from reduced flood management services therefore is 
considered a conservative estimate 
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being able to repay that debt through premium receipts5, and expectations of higher future flood 
losses.  
In an effort to bring solvency back to the NFIP, the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance 
Reform Act of 2012 mandated the gradual elimination of most flood insurance subsidies6 by 
raising flood insurance premiums by 25% each year until full risk rates are reached (Wriggins 
2014).  The potential for dramatic premium increases for certain policies under Biggert-Watters 
raised immediate concerns of housing affordability, particularly for low income households. This 
criticism resulted in passage of the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act (HFIAA) of 
2014, which repealed many of the mandated premium increases required under Biggert Watters.  
While HFIAA resulted in more affordable premiums for property owners the continuation of 
subsidized policies ensures the continued insolvency of the NFIP.  Biggert-Waters and the 
HFIAA represent the perpetually conflicting policy goals of the NFIP. Subsidized premiums 
offer affordable protection to low income property owners and increase participation in the 
program, but do not fully fund the indemnity payments and cost of administering the program 
requiring taxpayers to cover the additional losses.  
In response to the perpetual nature of the conflicting policy goals, a pre-flood homeowner 
buyout program has been proposed as a compromise between offering affordable flood 
protection and reducing total liability (Hayat & Moore 2015). A pre-flood buyout program could 
take a number of proposed forms including a legal agreement between homeowner and local 
flood management agencies to move in exchange for insurance premium reductions, or agencies 
could purchase a conservation easement on the property. In one form it would allow low income 
                                                                 
5 Biggert-Waters required FEMA to issue a report to congress with options to repay all NFIP debt within 10 years of 
the bills implementation (GAO 2015) 
6 Properties subject to the 25% premium increase include secondary residences, businesses, and severe repetitive 
loss properties. See (GAO 2015) for premium status of all property types  
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homeowners to maintain their affordable insurance policy in exchange for agreeing to relocate in 
the event of a flood damaging greater than 50% of the value of their home. This would also 
prevent demolition of otherwise suitable undamaged homes before the next flood event. Other 
risk mitigation tools like elevating homes or building levies may reduce risk but fall short of a 
permanent solution as extraordinary events can still damage mitigated homes and base flood 
levels can vacillate over time with climate change (Pachauri & Meyer 2014).   
Homeowner buyout programs have been employed for decades as a permanent means of 
reducing future flood risk exposure in flood zones (Binder & Binder 2013; Zavar 2015; de Vries, 
D.H., Fraser 2012). Buyout programs have the capacity to further reduce flood risk for properties 
not involved in the agreement.  As coastal and riverine communities have expanded over the 
decades, the natural flood protections of swamps, forests, mangroves, and other natural barriers 
were drained and developed. Consequently, properties further from bodies of water were at 
increased risk of flood. (Kerr, 2007; Costanza, 2006; Snohomish County 2013). After a buyout, 
land that had once served as a protective barrier to other development can be restored to its 
natural state (or otherwise protective state) to help prevent damage to other homes.  Other 
research has estimated possible benefits of buyout programs that permit restoration of costal and 
riverine flood plains. Shepart et al. (2011) compiled 75 publications in a meta-analysis with 
many showing costal marshes provide valuable hazard mitigation properties through wave 
attenuation and shoreline stabilization.  Additionally, floodplains in their natural state are home 
to more species of plants and animals than in any other landscape unit in most regions of the 
world (Tockner & Stanford 2002).  
Homeowner buyout programs of the past have primarily focused on contracting to buy 
out properties after they have been damaged by flooding (Binder, 2013; Dalbom, 2013; de Vries, 
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D.H., Fraser, 2007). It is not uncommon however, for homeowners to receive indemnity 
payment, rebuild, and then participate in a buyout program; an unfortunate consequence of the 
length of time it can take to complete the process and cause of increased costs. The proposed 
buyout program analyzed in this paper takes a new approach. Homeowners in flood zones are 
able to sign up for a guaranteed buyout for the full market value of their home before a flood 
event occurs. Such a program could have both desirable and undesirable features for 
homeowners. The homeowner would have peace of mind knowing what will occur after a major 
flood event.  Property value in surrounding areas can be increased by restored coastline or open 
space created through buyouts (Bolitzer and Netusil 2000; Dale-Johnson and Yim 1990; Irwin 
2015).  Homeowners and communities can more effectively plan for flood events and their 
aftermath which may include a tax base changes (GAO 2004), infrastructure modification 
(Dalbom 2014) or in some cases relocation of entire communities (Brown 1996). Completing the 
buyout paperwork before the flood event (benefit-cost analysis, appraisals, and conservation 
planning) could greatly reduce post flood legal processes and thus reduce the time needed to 
complete the buyout. On the other hand, the homeowner would be giving up the option to change 
their mind and rebuild their home in the same location after a flood occurred; that loss of option 
value may represent a significant disutility to individuals with strong attachments to the location 
of their current home. Given these possible benefits and costs, how much would a homeowner be 
willing to pay (WTP) for the certainty of a guaranteed buyout or how much would they have to 
be paid to be willing to accept (WTA) it? We have carefully crafted a survey to measure just 
that. Results of this study can inform policy makers of the propensities of homeowners in our 
sample communities and communities of similar characteristics (see Figure 1 for the spatial 
distribution of survey respondents).  
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This paper makes multiple contributions to the body of flood risk mitigation literature.  
As of the writing there is no known analysis of homeowners’ willingness to participate in pre-
flood buyout agreement programs.  Employing a payment card contingent valuation survey we 
value homeowners’ WTP for a guarantee their home will be bought out following a major flood 
event.  The model allows us to quantify the effects and significance of having recent flood 
experience, self-estimates of flood risk, income, home value, and other demographic variables.  
The second part of our analysis measures the effect of the same variables on homeowners’ 
willingness to sign up for a buyout program that is coupled with mandated purchase of flood 
insurance.   
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CHAPTER 2 
METHODS 
 
2.1 Contingent Valuation Methodology  
 To investigate (WTP) for a guaranteed buyout, this study uses an online payment card 
contingent valuation survey design.7 Contingent valuation (CV) is a common valuation method 
for goods that are not currently traded in a marketplace (Lindhjem & Mitani 2012; Carson 2012; 
Champ et al. 2011; Carson & Mitchell 1989; Bateman 2002). In the absence of market research, 
practitioners in this field often rely on stated preference methods to value goods. The CV method 
uses a survey instrument to describe a good, and then elicit information from survey participants 
about their WTP for that good. The technique is especially useful when other indirect non-
market valuation methods like travel cost or hedonic are not technically feasible (Smith 1993; 
Bateman 2002).  
 This paper employs the CV payment card elicitation format which presents an ordered 
series of dollar values from which respondents reveal their willingness to pay each amount by 
checking yes or no. This response format is used a balance between efficiency and reliability. 
Relative to dichotomous choice,  the payment card format provides narrower intervals to estimate 
efficiently (Brown et al. 1996). Additionally, it provides more reliable responses when compared 
to open ended formats. Cameron and Huppert (1989) note that using the center of the intervals as 
a point estimate of WTP can bias the parameter estimates. Additionally, range and centering bias 
are found to be a concern with early payment card studies (Carson & Mitchell 1989). Rowe, 
Schulze and Breffle (1996) however, use an exponential response scale and find no evidence of 
                                                                 
7 For a more extensive review of tradeoffs between the payment card and other elicitation formats see (Champ & 
Bishop 2006; Bateman 2002) 
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range or centering bias as long as respondents were able to select values on the upper end of the 
value distribution. They find the inclusion of exceptionally high bids may influence welfare 
estimates; this study uses focus groups to determine the maximum bid to minimize both 
truncating and excessively large bids.  
Exponential response scales display values to respondents with increasing interval 
distances between values. This approach has a number of features. First, exponential response 
scales allow practitioners to include larger ranges of values without including a cumbersome 
number of choices (Rowe et al. 1996). Secondly, it assumes individuals have the ability to 
quickly distinguish between two values increases proportionally to the value of the good (Rowe, 
Schulze, and Breffle 1996). For example, one may consider the cents when purchasing a pencil 
but would not if purchasing a car.  Rowe et al. (1996) use Weber’s law8 as a base for the interval 
distances of the payment card. This is the method used to construct the payment card in this 
paper.   
Many efforts were made to increase the precision of the WTP responses. As Mitchell and 
Carson (1989) and the NOAA panel on contingent valuation (Arrow et al. 1993) recommend, the 
background information and new pre-flood buyout sections are designed to encourage 
respondents to think in depth about their personal budget and how the proposed buyout would 
affect them.  Flood risk, budget, community, and how much they value the security of knowing 
they would be paid the full value of their home following a major flood event are all brought to 
their attention through the background information. Care was taken when framing the new 
guaranteed buyout policy to provide what Carson and Hanemann (2005) call face validity. 
                                                                 
8 Weber’s law quantifies the distance necessary to perceive changes between two stimuli. The next noticeably 
different value is calculated using the exponential function: Bn = B1 x (1+k)n+1  Where Bn is the bid value n units 
from the initial bid, B1 is the initial Bid, and k is  a positive constant. (Rowe et al. 1996) 
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Respondents should believe in the plausibility of the non-market good transaction. This study 
uses feedback from focus groups to tailor and refine the survey language to match the experience 
and language commonly used by homeowners when communicating about flood risk and 
mitigation. The good must be clearly and fully described to the respondent to elicit a precise 
estimate of WTP, but the description must be neutral and not so long as to bore or encourage 
skimming by the respondent. In cases where the respondent is unfamiliar with the good, they will 
make their own assumptions thus including unintended elements into the good being valued 
(Champ et al. 2011). Bateman and Mawby (2004) show survey respondents can become tired, 
bored, or even annoyed with excessive information. This survey is carefully crafted to provide 
pertinent elements of the proposed policy while avoiding participant overload. Answer choices 
are randomized when possible to avoid ordering effects (Champ et al. 2011; Bateman 2002). 
A common concern regarding contingent valuation studies is hypothetical bias (Loomis 
2011; Murphy et al. 2005). Hypothetical bias occurs when survey respondents express they are 
WTP more than what they would actually pay in a market transaction.  Although not universally 
accepted, (Krosnick et al. 1996) hypothetical bias has been noted in a number of meta analyses 
(Loomis 2011; Murphy et al. 2005) indicating care should be taken to minimize its effects. One 
method employed to reduce hypothetical bias is through the use of cheap talk scripts within the 
survey (Tonsor & Shupp 2011; Taylor et al. 1999). These scripts inform respondents of the 
possible tendency of survey takers to misstate their actual WTP and encourages them to be more 
cognizant of their actual WTP. We include a short cheap talk script in the key valuation 
questions to minimize hypothetical bias. 
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2.2 Survey Design and Data Collection 
Prior to survey administration, three focus groups of homeowners in flood prone areas 
were held to refine the survey instrument. The primary goal was to ensure respondents 
understand the language of the buyout scenario as there are numerous unique terms and 
acronyms in the flood risk and mitigation domain.  Additionally, the focus groups sought to 
identify languages or concepts that clarified the valuation process or could be cause for response 
bias. We also review the qualitative responses from the focus groups sessions to ensure the 
content is not unduly influencing respondents’ answers. 
In March of 2016, an online survey was distributed to a Qualtrics participant panel which 
collected 491 responses. Respondents were recruited from zip codes containing flood zones 
within the 100 year floodplain. To be eligible, respondents must own their own home and verify 
their flood zone code through FEMAs National Flood Hazard Layer tool. This respondent panel 
was chosen as a sample of the target demographic of homeowner buyout programs.  The online 
platform Qualtrics was selected to administer the survey because of its large national panel, 
ability to quickly screen thousands of panel members on specific criteria, and cost of 
administration.   
The survey is presented in Appendix A. It begins with a series of eligibility screens to 
ensure respondents are homeowners, living within the 100 year floodplain, and over the age of 
18. Floodplain status was determined by incorporating the National Flood Hazard Layer 
(NFHL)9 into the online platform. Each respondent is asked to enter their address into the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency NFHL tool. Once entered, the tool displays the flood 
zone information respondents enter into the screening question.  
                                                                 
9 The National Flood Hazard Layer (NFHL) is a digital database that contains flood hazard mapping data from 
FEMA’s National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).  fema.gov/national-flood-hazard-layer-nfhl 
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The second section of the survey provides the respondent with background information 
on flood risk and describes what homeowners can currently do if their house is severely damaged 
in a flood, including brief information about the nature of conventional post-flood buyout 
programs. Section three describes the features of a hypothetical pre-flood guaranteed buyout 
program. In short, this program is a pre-flood agreement that guarantees homeowners their home 
would be bought out after a flood causing substantial damage. In exchange, the homeowners are 
required to relocate. Respondents are then presented with an ordered series of hypothetical 
payment values, and asked to mark yes or no for each to indicate whether they would be willing 
to pay that amount of money for the program.  The payment values are 11 exponentially 
ascending dollar amounts ranging from $0 to $3,500.  If a respondent is not willing to pay any 
amount of money to participate (they will check “no” for all dollar amounts) the survey takes 
them to another payment card asking respondents how much they would need to be paid to 
participate in the program. The survey has both WTA and WTP sections as some focus group 
participants indicated they had a negative value for the program. However, we present the WTP 
card first to avoid incentive compatibility problems associated with people declaring they would 
need to be paid to accept the program if payment is presented as an option.  
 The fourth section of the survey asks homeowners if they would be willing to sign up for 
a different kind of program. This hypothetical program is only available to homeowners with 
flood insurance. Homeowners with flood insurance who sign up for the hypothetical program 
would be allowed to pay the old subsidized insurance rates. Insurance rates are increasing to be 
actuarially fair, so in the absence of such a program insurance will be much more expensive. The 
survey instrument calculates and explains the annual savings from signing up for this 
hypothetical program. For a person who currently has insurance, savings are found by using the 
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homeowner’s reported premium and FEMA’s own estimate that subsidized premiums are 40-
45% of full risk rates (Hayes and Neal 2011; GAO 2013). For survey respondents who do not 
currently have insurance, full risk and subsidized rates are calculated using their home value and 
assumes a 1% annual chance of substantial flood.    
The last survey section gathers demographic, risk perception, home characteristics, flood 
experience, and other information to be used as controls. Socioeconomic factors are important 
components of many flood risk mitigation programs so estimating relationships among these 
variables is important. Additionally flood experience and risk perceptions have been shown to 
affect risk mitigation decisions (Atreya, Ferreira, and Michel-Kerjan 2015; Browne and Hoyt 
2000). 
 Instrument reliability is enhanced through a number of pre-survey launch validity checks. 
The survey was distributed to multiple municipal and regional floodplain managers to ensure 
content validity and plausible implementation of the proposed buyout program. Two soft 
launches were conducted to verify respondents were being ushered through the survey as 
intended and to identify screening questions.  Following the soft launches multiple attention filter 
and logical validation questions10 were added to ensure data quality.  
Some individuals respond to contingent valuation questions by reporting they are not 
willing to pay anything for the proposed good. Such a respondent may truly have WTP equal to 
zero for that good, but such responses may instead be serving as expressions of protest over the 
good or an element of the valuation context (Carson & Mitchell 1989). The inclusion of protest 
responses in a CV analysis can bias WTP estimates.  We identify and remove protest votes that 
                                                                 
10 Attention filters are simple questions that ensure respondents are reading the questions and typically require a 
specific response to pass. Logical filters remove respondents who fail to provide logically consistent answers 
throughout the survey.   
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meet two conditions. First, they are unwilling to participate in the program for any amount of 
money. Secondly, they indicate through other survey responses that they are including spurious 
elements in their value expression. 
 
2.3 Conceptual Model and Data Analysis 
In this paper, we will value and model homeowners’ WTP to sign up for the pre-flood 
buyout agreement previously described. The buyout agreement can be thought of as a bundle of 
goods (both positive and negative) for which the homeowner reveals a value. The purpose here is 
not to disentangle the values that homeowners place on the different components but rather the 
combined value of the entire buyout agreement. This is achieved by developing a theoretical 
model representing the value change between the baseline level of utility without the buyout 
program and the level of utility with the buyout program.  
The indirect utility functions (v) represented in equation (1) are used to derive the 
compensating welfare measure (c) necessary to equate homeowners’ utility with and without the 
buyout agreement. In other words, c represents how much the homeowner would be WTP for the 
guaranteed buyout program Q1 at price vector p1 to achieve the same level of utility as they 
would have without the buyout program (Q0, p0) (Champ, Boyle, and Brown 2011). 
 
(1)   𝑣(𝑝0,𝑄0 , 𝑦) = 𝑣(𝑝1, 𝑄1, 𝑦 − 𝑐) 
 
To estimate WTP, we elicit preference information from respondents through a payment 
card contingent valuation survey.  Preference information selected by each respondents is 
recorded as a bid interval containing the true WTP.  This interval represents the dependent 
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variable in our analysis as we model the true WTP. To build a framework to estimate 
respondents WTP, we rely on an efficient maximum likelihood interval regression developed by 
Cameron and Huppert (1989). In performing this analysis, we estimate coefficients for a number 
of explanatory variables (see Table 1). Individual WTP values can be estimated as:  
 
 (2)    𝑐𝑖 = 𝑧𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖 
 
where ci represents WTP for respondent i, 𝑢𝑖 is the random error term with mean zero and 
standard deviation σ, 𝑧𝑖
′ is a vector of independent variables that explain response variation, and 
β is the vector of coefficients. See Table 1 for a full list of variables included in the function 𝑧𝑖
′𝛽. 
We cannot directly observe ci as a consequence of the payment card elicitation format, but rather  
we observe the interval within which it falls. Therefore, the probability that the true WTP ci falls 
within the interval chosen by respondent i is: 
 
(3)  Pr(𝑐𝑖 ⊆ ($𝐵𝑙𝑖 , $𝐵𝑢𝑖) = Pr [ 
($𝐵𝑙𝑖 − 𝑧𝑖
′𝛽)
𝜎
< 𝑡𝑖 <
$𝐵𝑙𝑢 − 𝑧𝑖
′𝛽
𝜎
 ] 
 
where ti is a standard normal variable $𝐵𝑙𝑖 and $𝐵𝑢𝑖 represent the upper and lower bounds of the 
interval containing ci, and  𝑧𝑖
′𝛽  is the function representing the solution to equation (1) defining 
the value being estimated (Champ, Boyle, and Brown 2011).  As an alternative specification we 
take the log transformation of the upper and lower bounds ($𝐵𝑙𝑖 , $𝐵𝑢𝑖 ); Cameron and Huppert 
(1989) show this transformation is a better fit for the expected skewness of the value distribution, 
but it also bottom-censors negative valuations at zero.  
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This paper uses a second regression to examine homeowners’ willingness to participate in 
a buyout program coupled with flood insurance. That hypothetical program is similar to the one 
proposed in Hayat and Moore (2014); a homeowner in a high risk areas would receive subsidized 
flood insurance premiums in exchange for agreeing to accept a buyout in the event that their 
house is damaged and flood and losses are more than 50% of its value. The survey asks 
homeowners only a single question about whether they would be willing to sign up for the 
program given the savings on insurance payments they would realistically obtain from such a 
program; thus, we analyze that single dichotomous choice with a maximum likelihood logit 
regression. We estimate the effect of explanatory variables x j on the probability of the 
homeowner signing up for the program. 𝑃(𝑦 = 1|𝑥𝑗) =
exp (𝑥𝑗𝛽)
1+exp (𝑥𝑗𝛽)
  In this model, y is the binary 
response variable that takes a value of 1 if the respondent will sign up for the program and 0 if 
they decline. The explanatory variables xj include factors such as income, flood experience, 
community attachment, and whether or not the homeowner already has flood insurance.   
 
2.4 Hypotheses   
A number of papers have shown that homeowners base their flood mitigation decisions 
on a number of economic, social, and political factors (Browne & Hoyt 2000; Fraser et al. 2003; 
de Vries, D.H., Fraser 2012; FEMA 1998). From these papers, we derive the following 
hypotheses for the effects of the factors in equation (2).  
Brown and Hoyt (2000) study demand for flood insurance and find the likelihood that a 
household has flood insurance increases with income and flood experience and decreases with 
price. Fraser et al. (2003) surveyed residents and flood management officials in communities that 
had recently participated in a post-flood buyout to examine factors contributing to success and 
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failure of buyout programs. They find risk, neighborhood attachment, and buyout process factors 
such as trust, communication, and timing to be important predictors. Fraser found 37% of their 
sample indicated future flood risk was very important in their decision to participate in the 
buyout program. Furthermore, Atreya, Ferreira, and Michel-Kerjan (2015) and Browne and Hoyt 
(2000) find previous flood experience to be a driver of current risk expectations. Studies of post 
flood buyout programs have found that financial considerations, land development pressures, 
connection to neighborhood, perceived risks, and the quality of relationships between residents 
and local officials influence a homeowner’s willingness to accept a buyout (de Vries, D.H., 
Fraser 2012; Fraser et al. 2003). Over 50% of residents surveyed by Fraser (2003) expressed an 
aversion to losing neighborhood based social networks, while others voiced an eagerness to leave 
as they perceived the neighborhood to be in decline. FEMA’s Flood Acquisition Manual from 
1998 also identifies size of household and opinions of family and friends as influentia l over 
property owners’ decision to participate in a buyout.   
From these findings, we hypothesize WTP for the pre-flood buyout program will increase 
with self-reported flood risk estimates, number of insurance claims, size of the largest claim, 
income, and flood insurance premium.  We hypothesize homeowners will pay less for the 
guaranteed buyout if they have lived in the community longer, communicate with their neighbors 
more frequently, have family in the community or believe a higher proportion of their neighbors 
will move after a flood.  In addition to these hypotheses, we estimate the effect on WTP for 
homeowners that believed the buyout would be good for the environment. We hypothesize this 
effect to be positive. See Table 2 for a summary of hypotheses.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
3.1 Summary Statistics  
In total, our survey yielded 491 useable responses after filtering respondents that are 
deemed incomplete or made logically incongruent responses.  All respondents are homeowners 
living within the 100 year floodplain. Nearly all respondents are primary homeowners (97% are 
owner occupiers) which is important as they are the focus of hazard mitigation grant programs. 
Forty-six percent currently are covered by flood insurance and 11% live in designated V-zones 
which are subject to wave action.  Forty-six percent of our sample have flood insurance which 
matched the latest market penetration estimates of around 50% and suggests no self-selection by 
insured households. We do however, find insurance rates in the middle and high income 
categories (57% and 53% respectively) are much higher than the low income category (38%). 
Table 4 contains results of the motivations our respondents expressed in their decision to 
purchase flood insurance. In terms of flood experience 33% of respondents have experienced at 
least one flood and 34 homeowners are in designated repetitive loss properties, of which 89% are 
in the low or middle income category (see Table 3 for the complete distribution). Fifty-two 
percent of respondents were female and the average household size is 2.75. Thirty percent have 
some college and 59% have a bachelors or advanced degree.  For a more detailed description of 
respondent characteristics see Figure 2 and Table 5.  
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3.2 Regression Results 
We run two different samples through our linear and log model specifications. The full 
sample (n=491) and a conservative sample (n=447) where we filter out individuals that spent less 
than 7 minutes on the survey or left some answers blank. Only conservative sample results are 
shown in this paper as the two specifications are not meaningfully different. To elicit preference 
information for the pre-flood buyout program, participants are presented with a payment card 
consisting of a series of yes-no response options to corresponding dollar values. Respondents are 
asked to indicate whether or not they would be willing to pay each amount. Through interval 
regression analysis we estimate the effects of 20 potential explanatory variables. We find self-
reported flood risk estimates, the expectation of neighbors also signing up for the buyout, 
environmental concerns, flood experience, and income all significantly affect homeowners’ WTP 
to sign up for the pre-flood buyout program. The average homeowner WTP is $605. A summary 
of WTP interval observations can be seen in Figure 3. 
Table 6 displays parameter estimates for the two model specifications. The first is the 
linear specification, flowed by the log specification where we log transform the dependent 
variable. The linear form allows negative values from respondents that express a disutility from 
the program and would need to be paid to participate but assumes a normal distribution of WTP 
values. Additionally, the linear functional form allows us to interpret the coefficients as marginal 
effects. The log transformed specification transforms of the interval bounds as specified in 
Cameron and Huppert (1989). This specification censors the few observed intervals lower than 
zero, but follow a right skewed distribution common to valuation distributions.  
Consistent with previous flood mitigation literature homeowners that have a higher self-
estimated flood risk are willing to pay more for a guaranteed buyout. We find as a homeowner’s 
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estimate of the probability of flood in the next 30 years increases by one percentage point their 
WTP for the program increases by $6.24. If two neighbors have a 50 percentage point difference 
in expectation of flood in the next 30 years the difference in their WTP would be $324.  
We ask respondents to estimate the proportion of their neighbors that would accept a pre-
flood buyout program as it is presented to them. We hypothesize that increasing the proportion of 
neighbors accepting the agreement would positively affect other homeowners own WTP for the 
program. Our analysis shows for every percentage point increase of neighbors signing up for the 
program, homeowners are willing to pay an additional $4.69. If one homeowner believes 3 of 
their 10 neighbors would take the pre-buyout and another believes 7 of 10, the difference in their 
WTP would be $235.  
Environmental literature notes multiple environmental benefits of removing development 
and restoring the most vulnerable flood prone areas to a natural or otherwise protective state. 
Two of the four model specifications indicated a significant effect from environmental concern. 
Respondents who believe buyouts have environmental benefits were willing to pay $215 (full 
sample) more to participate in the pre-flood buyout. This effect could be due to homeowners 
holding positive values for the land being restored to its natural state.  
We hypothesize homeowners that have previously made a claim to be willing to pay 
more for the program.  We find that only those that had made a claim of $25,000 or more had 
WTP values that are statistically significantly higher than other homeowners.  Homeowners in 
this category (n=44) are found to be willing to pay an additional $590 to sign up. These 
homeowners are intimately aware of the risk they face and the hassles of rebuilding and may be 
keen to participate in a buyout after the next substantial flood event. 
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Examining respondents who currently have flood insurance we find each additional 
dollar a spent on flood insurance premiums increases their WTP by $0.09. Therefore, our 
findings imply that one homeowner facing an additional $1,000 in annual premiums would be 
willing to pay an additional $90 to sign up. A buyout agreement could decrease the future 
spending on flood protection for these households so they would be willing to pay more.  
Consistent with economic theory, households with greater income are willing to pay 
more for normal goods. We find the average WTP for households making under $70,000 per 
year to be $446. Households in the $70,000 to $150,000 range would pay $691 ($245 more than 
low-income category) and those making more than $150,000 were willing to pay $1,202 ($756 
more than low-income category).  We find homeowners with home values between $100,000 
and $250,000 were willing to pay more but only in the log transformed conservative sample.  
A dummy variable indicating whether or not the respondent was African American 
indicated a negative and significant willingness to pay but only at the 10% level and only for the 
log transformed conservative sample.  
 
3.3 Buyout Coupled With Insurance Decision Factors 
Our second objective is to evaluate homeowners’ willingness to participate in a similar 
buyout program coupled with mandatory purchase of flood insurance. Respondents are presented 
with the option to sign up for the program with reduced insurance premiums and a guaranteed 
buyout agreement or face full rate premiums. Within our panel 68% of respondents indicated 
they would sign up. To explain the factors that significantly contribute to the likelihood a 
homeowner will sign up we employ a logit regression maximum likelihood estimation model.  
Our results (Table 7) show that homeowners’ self-reported flood risk, premium savings, size of 
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household, time spent in community, environmental concern, income, and race affect 
homeowners’ willingness to sign up for coupled program.  
Regression coefficients from logistic regressions are helpful in determining the sign and 
significance of partial effects but interpreting the magnitude of the effect can be difficult. The 
difficulty stems from the non-linear marginal effects, where the marginal effect depends on the 
values the levels of all of the other variable in the regression. We use an average partial effect 
(APE) method (sometimes called the average marginal effect) to express probabilities 
homeowners will sign up at different levels of the explanatory variables (Wooldridge J. M. 
2011).  For binary explanatory variables we estimate the discrete difference in probability of sign 
up between both levels of the binary variable using the observed values of the other predictors 
for individual respondents. This difference in values is averaged for all respondents to produce 
the APE (Wooldridge J. M. 2011). This method allows us to express intuitive probability of sign 
up differences for the two groups or between discrete levels of continuous variables.  
Our analysis shows homeowners’ self-reported estimate of flood risk varies positively 
with probability of sign up. We estimate a homeowner who believes their home will be flooded 
with 100% certainty in the next 30 years is 10% more likely to sign up for the buyout program 
when compared to a homeowner that believes there is a 50/50 chance, and 21% more likely than 
one who is certain no flood will occur. This is consistent within the flood risk mitigation 
literature that says higher risk homeowners are more likely to take steps to mitigate their flood 
risk. 
We hypothesized premium savings from signing up would increase the probability of 
sign up but we found the effect to be negative. This negative effect included all homeowners 
with and without insurance. When we subtract out the effect for homeowners that currently have 
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insurance the overall effect becomes insignificant. This makes intuitive sense as currently 
uninsured homeowners would be forced to purchase insurance to sign up for this program, an 
action they have already revealed through their behavior they are unable or unwilling to do.  
Thirty-nine percent of uninsured respondents express they could not afford the premium and 
45% said they don’t worry about their home being flooded (Table 4) 
Our analysis shows income to be a factor in sign up rates. The predicted sign-up rate of 
households making under $70,000 is 63.6%, compared to 74.7% for the middle income group, 
and 80% for the top income group of $150,000 and above.  
For each additional member of a household, we find the probability of signing up 
increases. The predicted probability of a household with 2 inhabitants signing up for the program 
is 66.4%. This probability increases to 83.2% for households with 6 occupants. This relationship 
can also be seen in Table 8, showing the observed sign up rates across number of inhabitants.   
 We hypothesized a longer neighborhood tenure would decrease willingness to sign up 
but found the relationship to be positive. This effect may be due to some long term low income 
households wanting to leave the neighborhood but not having the means. Our data show lower 
income households have a longer neighborhood tenure. We also find homeowners with family in 
town less willing to participate in the buyout program.  
We find environmental concerns to increase signups for the pre-flood buyout program 
coupled with insurance. Homeowners that believe buyouts are good for the environment are 14% 
more likely to sign up when compared to those that did not hold that belief. Twenty-five percent 
of respondents express this belief (Table 9). 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS  
 
4.1 Conclusion  
This study was designed to improve understanding of homeowner preferences towards pre-
flood buyout programs. We tested the effects of flood experience, risk estimates, community 
attachment, income and other demographic variables on homeowners’ WTP for a guaranteed 
buyout in the event of substantial flood damage to their home. We also tested homeowners’ 
willingness to participate in a buyout program that is coupled with insurance. Results of these 
two analyses can be used by policymakers and local flood officials in designing and pursuing 
buyout policies to reduce community and national flood risk.      
Our results imply that a free policy offering pre-flood buyout agreements would improve 
the welfare of homeowners by an average of $605. We find self-estimated flood risk, income, 
flood experience, and environmental concern to vary positively with how much the homeowner 
is willing to pay. A homeowner who believes their home will flood with almost certainty in the 
next 30 years would have an average welfare gain of $929 over a homeowner that believed there 
is a 50% probability of flood. Those who have experienced flood damage over $25,000 have a 
welfare benefit of $590 over those who have never had a claim. We also find a significant 
neighbor effect indicating homeowners who believe a larger percentage of their neighbors would 
leave following a flood have a larger welfare benefit from the program. For each percentage 
point increase in neighbors leaving, the welfare effect increases by $4.69. Welfare effects 
estimated here do not include externalities.  
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When offered the chance to sign up for a program that combines this guaranteed buyout 
with mandatory purchase of flood insurance with a subsidized rate, 68% of respondents indicated 
they would sign up. We find self-estimated risk, income, flood experience, neighborhood tenure, 
and environmental concern to vary positively with the probability a homeowner would sign up 
for the program.  
With limited hazard mitigation grant funds and other appropriations, national and 
regional planners must target not only high risk areas but also areas that show a higher 
propensity to participate in mitigation programs. The results of this study indicate that planners 
might do well to prioritize communities with high flood risk, recent flood experience, and where 
residents are aware of the environmental benefits of floodplain restoration. Additionally, the 
results indicate that homeowners may be more willing to participate in buyout programs if their 
neighbors are also participating as was the case for Valmeyer, Illinois and Pattonsburg, Missouri, 
two towns relocated in their entirety after a flood (Brown 1996).  
Our results show homeowners have more value for a guaranteed buyout and are more 
likely to sign up for the coupled program if they believe the end result will be better for the 
environment. These findings suggest homeowners would be more inclined to participate in 
buyout programs if environmental/sustainability components are included in the structure of 
post-buyout planning and the environmental benefits of land restoration are included in 
educational material used to inform property-owners.   
Much of the risk mitigation literature examines flood mitigation at a local or regional 
level (Brody et al. 2008; Calil et al. 2015; Kick et al. 2011; de Vries, D.H., Fraser 2012). 
Furthermore, most published case studies involve recently flooded communities. While recently 
26  
flooded communities are often included in high risk zones targeted by mitigation programs, the 
national sample our data allows us to make much wider inferences.  
Policy makers and floodplain managers can gain insight from these results across various 
geographies and flood experience. Many of the factors we find to significantly contribute to 
homeowners willingness to participate in buyout programs are robust across other mitigation 
strategies in the literature. These include risk estimates, income, and flood experience.  Caution 
should, however, be exercised in applying our results to a program evaluation if details of the 
different proposed buyout program stray far from those presented to our survey respondents. 
Furthermore, actual participation rates in buyout programs may be lower than stated due to 
transaction costs. 
Through our regression analyses we were able to measure factors that affect 
homeowners’ willingness to participate in the pre flood buyout program proposed by Hayat and 
Moore (2015). These types of programs however, can be constructed to suit the many 
idiosyncrasies of different flood prone communities by modifying the selection criteria, terms of 
the buyout or level of mitigation assistance provided to homeowners. To further floodplain 
managers’ ability to match buyout program structure to suitable communities, a better 
understanding of what components of buyout programs are valued by homeowners would be of 
great worth. These insights could come from a choice experiment analysis examining which 
buyout program components homeowners value, which they hold little or negative value for, and 
how those components vary across homeowner characteristics.  
 Since its inception, the NFIP has been a program designed to provide affordable flood 
insurance that assists homeowners in rebuilding after flood events. While NFIP policies mandate 
smarter building codes, homes re-built in flood zones to the highest current standards will still be 
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subject to unknown conditions in the future. The quickly developing literature on climate change 
paints a concerning picture of homes subject to rising sea levels and changing precipitation 
patterns. Furthermore, communicating flood risk to homeowners through full risk rate insurance 
premiums has been difficult due to housing affordability concerns. Previous buyout research has 
shown buyouts can permanently absolve the threat of flood and reduce the national flood risk 
exposure while accommodating those concerns. Our findings add pre-flood buyout agreements to 
the portfolio of viable risk mitigation strategies with the added benefit of allowing homeowners 
and communities to plan for more desirable outcomes while also addressing the affordable 
housing disparity.   
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
Table 1. Variable names and descriptions 
  Variable Name Description 
 
 RiskEstimate How likely do you think your home will be hit by a flood in the 
next 30 years? 
NeighborsEstimate Estimate: Percent of neighbors taking buyout 
Inhabitants Number of people living in household 
YearsInTown How many years have you lived in your town? 
FamilyInTown Do you have family in town? Yes or No 
NeighborComDaily I communicate with my neighbors daily 
EnvironmentalConcern Buyouts are good for  the environment: Yes or No 
Ocean Home in V zone: Subject to wave action 
EverClaim Have you ever made a flood insurance claim on your home? Yes 
or No 
ClaimOver$25000 Have you made a claim for more than $25,000? Yes or No 
HVUnder100k   Ɨ Home Value is less than $100,000 
HV100to250k Home Value is $100,000 to $250,000 
HVOver250k Home Value is $250,000 and above 
InsuranceCurrent Home is currently covered by flood insurance 
Premium Flood insurance premium 
InsuranceCurrentByPremium Current premium 
HomeRaised Has your home ever been elevated? 
IncomeUnder70k   Ɨ Income Under $70,000 
Income70to149K  Income $70,000 to 149,000 
IncomeAbove150K  Income Above $150,000 
Age18to34   Ɨ Age 18 to 34 
Age35to54 Age 35 to 54 
Age55AndOlder Age 55+ 
NoCollege   Ɨ College degree not completed 
College College degree completed 
AdvancedDegree Advanced degree completed (Masters, PhD, MBA…) 
White White 
AfricanAmerican African American 
RaceOtherwiseSpecifeid   Ɨ Hispanic, Latino, Asian, Native American, Pacific Islander, 
Otherwise Specified 
Ɨ  Indicates omitted category 
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Table 2. Hypothesized effects  
Factor 
Hypothesized 
Sign WTP for buyout 
Probability of sign-
up for coupled 
buyout 
Estimated Risk  +  +  + 
Income  +  +  + 
Flood Experience  (Ever Claim)  + Not Significant  + 
Flood Experience (Largest Claim)  +  + Not Significant 
Neighbor decision to move  +  + Not Significant 
Premium  +  + NA 
Premium Savings  + NA  - 
Neighborhood Tenure  - Not Significant  + 
Neighbor Communication  - Not Significant Not Significant 
Family in Community  - Not Significant - 
Environmental Concern +  +  + 
Column 3 shows the sign of the effect of the corresponding factor on willingness to pay for a 
guaranteed pre-flood buyout agreement. Column 4 displays the sign of the effect of the 
corresponding factor on homeowners probability of signing up for a pre-flood buyout agreement 
coupled with mandatory purchase of flood insurance.  
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Table 3. Summary characteristics of households 
 
 
Insurance 
Current 
   Income Yes Total Percentage 
 IncomeUnder70K 90 238 38% 
 Income70to149K 122 215 57% 
 IncomeAbove150K 20 38 53% 
 Total 232 491 47% 
 
     
     
 
Insurance 
Current 
   Home Value Yes Total Percentage 
 HVUnder100k 27 90 30% 
 HV100to250k 121 255 47% 
 HVOver250k 84 146 58% 
 Total 232 491 47% 
 
     
     
 
Home Value 
   Income HVUnder100k HV100to250k HVOver250k N 
IncomeUnder70K 70 128 40 238 
Income70to149K 20 113 82 215 
IncomeAbove150K 0 14 24 38 
Total 90 255 146 491 
     
     
 
Repetitive 
Loss 
Properties 
   Income RLP Count Percentage 
  IncomeUnder70K 10 29% 
  Income70to149K 21 60% 
  IncomeAbove150K 4 11% 
  Total 35 
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Table 4: insurance purchase  
decision factors 
 
What factors lead you not to 
have flood insurance? Check 
each that applies Obs Affirmative % 
  
   I can’t afford to pay the premium 
along with all my other bills. 
259 100 39% 
I don’t really worry about having 
my house flooded. 
259 116 45% 
I think the government will help 
me if my house is damaged in a 
flood even if I don’t have 
insurance. 
259 17 7% 
I am not required to have flood 
insurance 
259 99 38% 
My bank made me buy flood 
insurance when I bought my 
home but I dropped it after a few 
years. 
259 16 6% 
 
   
What factors lead you to have 
flood insurance? Check each 
that applies Obs Affirmative 
 
 
% 
  
   
My bank required me to purchase 
flood insurance in order to get a 
mortgage. 
232 134 58% 
I worry about my house getting 
flooded. 
232 90 39% 
My house has already been 
flooded. 
232 40 17% 
I decided I can afford the 
premium. 
232 62 27% 
I do not think anyone will help 
me rebuild if my house is 
damaged by a flood and I am 
uninsured. 
232 53 23% 
Note: Panel members were asked which factors were important when deciding to purchase insurance 
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      Table 5 Summary statistics for continuous variables  
   Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
RiskEstimate 491 0.50 0.29 0 1 
NeighborsEstimate 491 60.25 25.68 0 100 
Premium 232 1282.98 1600.44 0 12000 
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Table 6  Interval regression estimates (1 of 2) 
  Linear Interval Regression  Log Interval Regression  
  
 
 
 
RiskEstimate 6.240***  0.010***   
 
(1.726)  (0.003)  
NeighborsEstimate 4.692***  0.007**    
 
(1.811)  (0.003)  
Inhabitants 40.048  0.049  
 
(34.405)  (0.06)  
YearInTown 3.859  0.011**    
 
(3.135)  (0.005)  
FamilyInTown -26.775  -0.097  
 
(89.14)  (0.156)  
NeighborComDaily 70.422  -0.129  
 
(98.698)  (0.174)  
EnvironmentalConcern 139.523  0.285*  
 
(93.763)  (0.164)  
Ocean -62.068  0.042  
 
(139.84)  (0.248)  
EverClaim -256.211**  -0.159  
 
(121.276)  (0.213)  
Claim over $25,000 590.497***  0.417  
 
(167.658)  (0.293)  
HV100to250k 66.909  0.343*  
 
(115.426)  (0.204)  
HVOver250k 73.344  -0.021  
 
(132.082)  (0.233)  
InsuranceCurrent -150.678  -0.062  
 
(100.242)  (0.177)  
Premium (Hundreds) 9.377**  0.005  
 
(3.964)  (0.007)  
Elevated Home 125.383  0.087  
  (111.207)  (0.195)  
N 447  447  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 6 cont. Interval regression estimates (2 of 2) 
  Linear Interval Regression  Log Interval Regression  
Income70to149K 245.166***  0.388* *   
 
(95.034)  (0.166)  
IncomeAbove150K 755.660***  0.940***   
 
(177.546)  (0.309)  
Age35to54 -173.281  -0.405**    
 
(108.585)  (0.19)  
Age55AndOlder -83.045  -0.297  
 
(118.411)  (0.207)  
CollegeDegree 233.406  0.139  
 
(146.068)  (0.255)  
AdvancedDegree 96.784  -0.086  
 
(139.192)  (0.243)  
White 24.702  -0.051  
 
(132.411)  (0.231)  
AfricanAmerican -135.556  -0.538*  
 
(176.946)  (0.309)  
_cons -457.615*  0.965**   
  (253.501)  (0.444)  
N 447  447  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 7  Logistic regression estimates (1 of 2) 
 
Logistic  
RiskEstimate 0.020***  
 
(0.005)  
NeighborsEstimate 0.005  
 
(0.005)  
Inhabitants 0.306***   
 
(0.111)  
YearInTown 0.022**    
 
(0.01)  
FamilyInTown -0.471*  
 
(0.28)  
NeighborComDaily -0.337  
 
(0.302)  
EnvironmentalConcern 0.957***   
 
(0.301)  
Ocean -0.131  
 
(0.434)  
EverClaim 0.792  
 
(0.409)  
Claim over $25,000 -0.064  
 
(0.632)  
HV100to250k 0.503  
 
(0.428)  
HVOver250k 0.279  
 
(0.553)  
N 447  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 7 cont.  Logistic regression estimates (2 of 2) 
  Logistic  
InsuranceCurrent 0.292  
 
(0.638)  
PremiumSavingAll (In Hundreds) -0.130**  
 
(0.063)  
InsCurrent#PremSavingsAll 0.106*  
 
(0.064)  
Elevated Home 0.455  
 
(0.373)  
Income70to149K 0.715**  
 
(0.293)  
IncomeAbove150K 1.111*  
 
(0.587)  
Age35to54 -0.473  
 
(0.332)  
Age55AndOlder 0.435  
 
(0.35)  
CollegeDegree -0.272  
 
(0.442)  
AdvancedDegree -0.209  
 
(0.415)  
White 0.057  
 
(0.387)  
AfricanAmerican 3.142***  
 
(1.103)  
_cons -1.801**  
 
(0.837)  
N 447  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 8: Cross-tabulations of respondent features with survey response to sign-up question 
 
Would you sign up for the pre-flood 
buyout program with insurance? 
 Race Yes Total Percentage 
Otherwise Specified 36 61 59% 
White 249 379 66% 
African American 50 51 98% 
Total 335 491 68% 
    
    Inhabitants Yes Total Percentage 
1 42 80 53% 
2 121 186 65% 
3 66 85 78% 
4 61 85 72% 
5 27 34 79% 
6 11 13 85% 
7 5 6 83% 
8 1 1 100% 
Total 334 490 68% 
    
    Environmental 
Concern Yes Total Percentage 
Yes 96 122 79% 
No 239 369 65% 
Total 239 369 65% 
    
    Claims last 20 years  Yes Total Percentage 
0 219 354 62% 
1 52 66 79% 
2 43 47 91% 
3 11 12 92% 
4+ 10 12 83% 
Total 335 491 68% 
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Table 9: Panel decision factors 
 
 
 
 
 
What thoughts below affected your 
thinking about whether or not you 
would accept this guaranteed buyout 
program? Check each one that applies                N Yes responses % 
    I am worried about floods. 491 107 22% 
I don’t really think flood risks are a big 
deal. 491 69 14% 
I would not want to abandon my 
neighbors. 491 42 9% 
My neighbors are likely to leave after a 
flood, so I might as well accept a 
buyout. 491 75 15% 
My neighbors are likely to leave after a 
flood, so I will like living here even 
more. 491 32 7% 
    
A buyout might hurt my community. 491 52 11% 
Getting my house out of the flood plain 
might help my community manage 
floods. 491 76 15% 
I have confidence in the federal 
government administering a buyout 
program. 491 69 14% 
I want to stay near the water. 491 85 17% 
This place is my home. 491 193 39% 
    I don’t like interacting with the federal 
government. 491 70 14% 
Allowing my house to be bought and 
the lot to be restored will be good for 
nature. 491 122 25% 
I like the security of knowing I will be 
bought out quickly. 491 222 45% 
I would be very happy to be paid the 
full value of my house after a flood. 491 241 49% 
I don’t believe that I would really 
receive the full value of my house if I 
accepted a buyout. 491 155 32% 
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Figure 1: Spatial distribution of survey respondents by zip codes  
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Figure 2: Panel characteristics (frequencies) 1 of 4 
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Figure 2 cont: Panel characteristics (frequencies) 2 of 4 
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Figure 2 cont: Panel characteristics (frequencies) 3 of 4 
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Figure 2 cont: Panel characteristics (frequencies) 4 of 4 
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Figure 3: Interval observations of willingness to pay for a guaranteed buyout 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Flood Policy Survey  
 
This online survey is research being done by Professor Amy W. Ando and Graduate Student 
Collin Reeser of the Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics at the University of 
Illinois. This survey is designed to evaluate people’s willingness to take part in possible new 
policies related to flood prone homes. 
Participation is voluntary and will take approximately 30 minutes. You will not be asked to give 
your name or address, and the online survey tool does not link any identifying information 
about you to your responses. 
You should only complete this survey if you are over 18 years old and own a home that is in a 
flood zone. Please complete it to the best of your ability. You may choose not to answer specific 
questions and can stop taking the survey at any time. 
Your input is very important for us. You may not benefit directly from participating, but the 
results of this research may help design better flood policies in the future. We are happy to 
provide you with a copy of the final report at your request. 
Will my study-related information be kept confidential? 
Yes, but not always. In general, we will not tell anyone any information about you. When this 
research is discussed or published, no one will know that you were in the study.  However, laws 
and university rules might require us to disclose study data.  For example, if required by laws or 
University Policy, study data may be seen or copied by the following people or groups:  
  The university committee and office that reviews and approves research studies, the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) and Office for Protection of Research Subjects;  
   University and state auditors, and Departments of the university responsible for 
oversight of research; 
 Federal government regulatory agencies such as the Office of Human Research 
Protections in the Department of Health and Human Services; 
 The financial sponsor of the research, The Natural Resource Defense Council 
If you have any questions about this survey research or its results please contact:  
Professor Amy Ando, amyando@illinois.edu, 217- 333-5130 
Graduate Student Collin Reeser, creeser2@illinois.edu   
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If you have any questions, concerns or complaints about your rights as a participant in this 
study, please contact the University of Illinois  Institutional Review Board at 217-333-2670 or via 
email at irb@illinois.edu. 
You should print this information sheet for your future reference.  If you agree with the above 
terms select "I Agree" below. 
 
 I agree  
 I do not wish to participate in this survey  
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4) Here you will look up the flood zone that your house is in and enter the flood zone 
information into the survey. Please note that information about your address will not be stored 
anywhere – it just helps the flood map tool to give you correct flood zone information. 
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Part 1: Preliminary Questions 
 
We will be asking several questions about your home. If you have multiple homes in different 
locations, please think about the address you entered in the previous question. 
1) Do you own your home? 
o Yes 
o No 
2) How much do you think your home is worth? 
o Under $49,999 
o $50,000   to 99,999 
o $100,000 to 149,999 
o $150,000 to 199,999 
o $200,000 to 249,999 
o $250,000 to 299,999 
o Over $300,000 
 
3) Is this your main home or a second home (like a vacation house or a rental property)? 
o Main home 
o Second home 
 
Part 2: General background information 
 Floods can cause a great deal of damage and flood risks are getting worse. Coastal 
towns are expected to see a 55% increase in the size of areas at high risk for flood 
(defined as areas with a 1 in 100 chance every year of a major flood) by the year 2100. 
The number of homes in high-risk flood areas along U.S. rivers is also expected to 
increase by 45% by the year 2100, with increases as high as 100% in some river areas 
of the Northwest and along small streams and rivers near the Great Lakes. 
 
 Communities can try to reduce the risk of future flood damage in several ways, including 
buying out houses in areas at serious risk of flood and restoring natural areas which will 
protect the remaining properties nearby. Communities can also turn this land into public 
parks.  
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In the event of a buyout, homes in flood plains can be restored to natural flood barriers as shown 
here. Source: Land Conservancy of NJ: http://www.tlc-nj.org/index.php/pr-pompton-39.  
 
 If homeowners do not have flood insurance, the government makes no promise that it 
will help them at all to pay for damage to their houses caused by a flood. Those people 
may rebuild their houses in the same locations, but that is likely to be at their own 
expense. 
 
 Currently the owner of a severely damaged house who does have insurance through the 
National Flood Insurance Program might be able to do two things: 
o Place a claim to get paid for at least some of the damage, and then rebuild their 
house in the same location (if permitted by local regulations).  
o Participate in a homeowner buyout program instead of rebuilding in the same 
location if a buyout program is made locally available.  Under current policy: 
 The homeowner would be paid the pre-flood market value   
 The buyout process, if allowed, can take from 1-4 years after a flood 
because a lot of paperwork must be completed. 
 
Part 3 
 
Possible new guaranteed buyout program policy – version A 
Consider a possible new kind of program for houses that are at risk of severe damage by floods 
– a guaranteed buyout program. If you were to sign up for it, it would work like this: 
 You would sign a permanent legal agreement promising that if a flood damages your 
house such that half its value (or more) is lost, then you will let the government buy your 
house and you will move.  
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o The government would pay you the value of the house on the market before it 
was damaged. 
o Some of the required paperwork would be completed before a flood to make the 
process much faster should it be needed. The buyout, if needed, would be 
completed in less than three months after a bad flood. 
 This arrangement gives you certainty that you will be able to sell your house for its full 
value quickly after a flood. 
 This arrangement takes away your option to rebuild your house in the same location 
after severe flood damage. 
 
 
5) Suppose the new policy were put in place, and you were offered the opportunity to pay to 
sign up for the new guaranteed buyout program. In exchange for having the certainty that you 
will be able to sell your house for its full value quickly after a flood (but giving up the option to 
rebuild after a major flood) you will pay a one-time fee. 
 
Please think about the largest amount of money you would be willing to pay this year in order 
to be able to sign up for the guaranteed buyout program, considering your financial situation 
and the flood risk you face. Remember, in your location, updated flood maps say that we can 
expect a flood at least once every 100 years (or a 1 in 4 chance of flood over the course of a 30 
year mortgage). 
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Consider the dollar amounts listed below. For each amount, check whether you would sign up 
(Yes or No) for the buyout program if that amount of money were your cost. Previous studies 
have found that some people overstate how much they are willing to pay. Therefore, consider 
thoroughly how the one-time cost will affect your budget so that you are really certain that you 
actually are willing to pay the money associated with each alternative that you say you would 
sign up. 
 
One Time Cost for You Yes, I would sign up No, I would not sign up 
$0      
$15      
$35      
$60      
$150      
$250      
$450      
$700      
$1200      
$2000      
$3500      
 
If respondent answers “No” to all amounts, go on to question 6.  
If answers “Yes” to any, skip question 6. 
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6) You answered “No” to all dollar amounts, indicating that you are not willing to sign up for 
this program even if it were free.  
 
Suppose now that you would actually be paid money to sign up for the new guaranteed buyout 
program. In exchange for giving up the option to rebuild in the same location after a major 
flood you will receive a single one-time payment. This policy will only be put in place if 
payments to homeowners aren’t too expensive. Please think about the smallest amount of 
money you would really need to be paid in order to agree to sign up for the guaranteed buyout 
program, considering your financial situation and the flood risk you face.  
 
Remember, in your location, updated flood maps say that we can expect a flood at least once 
every 100 years (or a 1 in 4 chance of flood over the course of a 30 year mortgage) 
 
Consider the dollar amounts listed below. For each amount, check whether you would sign up 
(Yes or No) for the buyout program if that amount of money were the one time payment you 
receive. Previous studies have found that some people overstate how much they would need to 
be paid to accept a change they don‘t want. Therefore, consider thoroughly how the one-time 
payment will affect your budget so that you are really certain of your answers. 
 
One Time Payment to You Yes, I would sign up No, I would not sign up 
$0      
$15      
$35      
$60      
$150      
$250      
$450      
$700      
$1200      
$2000      
$3500      
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7) With this new guaranteed buyout program in place, what percent of your neighbors do you 
think would sell their homes and move following a very damaging flood? Mark an X on the line 
below 
  |----------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------| 
     Percent: 0           25%  50%    75%     1 
  NONE                  Half of them   ALL 
8) How likely do you really think it is that your home will be hit in the next 30 years by a flood so 
bad that the house loses more than half its value? Mark an X on the line below 
 
  |----------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------| 
Probability: 0          .25  .50  .75     1 
  NO        not very           flip a coin         probably  YES 
     It certainly             50/50           It will certainly 
 won’t happen        happen 
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9) What thoughts below affected your thinking about whether or not you would accept this 
guaranteed buyout program?  Check each one that applies  
 
 Yes 
I am worried about floods.  
I don’t really think flood risks are a big deal.  
I would not want to abandon my neighbors.  
My neighbors are likely to leave after a flood, so I might as 
well accept a buyout. 
 
My neighbors are likely to leave after a flood, so I will like 
living here even more. 
 
A buyout might hurt my community.  
Getting my house out of the flood plain might help my 
community manage floods. 
 
I don’t like interacting with the federal government.  
I have confidence in the federal government administering 
a buyout program. 
 
I want to stay near the water.  
This place is my home.  
Allowing my house to be bought and the lot to be restored 
will be good for nature. 
 
I like the security of knowing I will be bought out quickly.  
I would be very happy to be paid the full value of my house 
after a flood. 
 
I don’t believe that I would really receive the full value of 
my house if I accepted a buyout.  
 
Other:  
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Part 4:  
 
11) Have you ever had a flood insurance policy on your home? (This is a separate policy from 
your homeowners policy.) 
o Yes 
o No 
 
12) Do you currently have a flood insurance policy on your home? 
o Yes 
o No 
13) Does your flood insurance policy cover the full value of your home? 
o Yes 
o No 
 
 
If you answered No to Question 12 Please answer Question 13 and then skip to Question 
20. 
 
If you answered Yes to Question 12 Please skip to Question 14 
 
14) What factors lead you not to have flood insurance? Check each that applies. 
 I can’t afford to pay the premium along with all my other bills. 
 I don’t really worry about having my house flooded. 
 I think the government will help me if my house is damaged in a flood even if I don’t have 
insurance. 
 I am not required to have flood insurance 
 My bank made me buy flood insurance when I bought my home but I dropped it after a 
few years. 
 Other (fill in): _________________________________________ 
 
15) Approximately how much in dollars do you pay each year for flood insurance?  (Does not 
include homeowners’ insurance) Please do not enter commas or dollar signs ("," "$") 
 $_______ 
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16) Under the National Flood Insurance Program you can buy insurance for up to $250,000 for 
your property. How much of the value of your home is insured under your flood insurance? 
Mark an X on the line below 
 
Percent: |----------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------| 
  0           25%  50%    75%  100% 
  NONE                    Half of it    ALL of  
my home 
 
17) What factors lead you to have flood insurance? Check each that applies.  
 My bank required me to purchase flood insurance in order to get a mortgage. 
 I worry about my house getting flooded. 
 My house has already been flooded. 
 I decided I can afford the premium. 
 I do not think anyone will help me rebuild if my house is damaged by a flood and I am 
uninsured. 
 Other (fill in): __________________________ 
 
18) Please check all that apply to your home 
         Yes 
My home is built on a crawl space  
My home is a mobile home  
My home has a basement  
My home was built before 1978  
My home has more than one level of living space  
 
 
 
Prices for flood insurance coverage are likely to rise in the future for many homeowners. The 
new price will better reflect a property’s actual risk of flooding. Such a homeowner can expect 
their premiums to increase 5-20% each year until they are approximately double the current 
rates in the year 2020. For example, if you are one of those households, your flood insurance 
premium is likely to increase from $750 a year to $1500 a year by 2020.    
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Possible new guaranteed buyout program - version B, combined with flood insurance 
Below is a different version of the guaranteed buyout program described earlier. With this version 
of the policy, homeowners must have flood insurance to sign up, and “payment” is in the form of 
reduced flood insurance rates. 
 
For the purposes of this question, assume if you don’t sign up for the program then your 
insurance premium will go up from $750 to $1500 
If you do sign up for this program, it works like this: 
 You could buy flood insurance at your current rate for as long as the house is there (rates will 
not go up). That rate would be lower than the rate you would otherwise have to pay, and so 
saves you $1500 every year that you own your home.  
 In most ways, this insurance would provide the same benefits as the current flood insurance 
program.  
 However, you would sign a permanent legal agreement promising that if a flood damages 
your house such that half its value (or more) is lost, then you will let the government buy your 
house and you will move. 
o The government would pay the value of the house on the market before it was 
damaged. 
o Some of the required paperwork can be completed before a flood to make the 
process much faster should it be needed. The buyout would be completed in less 
than three months after a bad flood. 
 
 This arrangement gives you certainty that you will be able to sell their house for its full value 
quickly after a flood. 
 This arrangement takes away your option to rebuild your house in the same location after 
severe flood damage. 
 This arrangement helps you to be sure your insurance stays affordable.  
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19) Suppose such a new policy were put in place, and you were offered the chance to sign up for 
this guaranteed buyout program combined with flood insurance. Think about whether you would 
accept that agreement starting this year, considering your financial situation and the flood risk you 
face.  
Remember, in your location, updated flood maps say that we can expect a flood at least once 
every 100 years (or a 1 in 4 chance of flood over the course of a 30 year mortgage)  
Assume the amount of money you save each year on flood insurance by signing up for this policy 
would be $1500 per year.  
Would you sign up for the policy? 
 Yes 
 No 
       Why?:________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Prices for flood insurance coverage are likely to rise in the future for many homeowners. The 
new price will better reflect a property’s actual risk of flooding. Such a homeowner can expect 
their premiums to increase 5-20% each year until they are approximately double the current 
rates in the year 2020. For example, a home in your area with features and a value similar to 
yours would likely see a flood insurance premium increase from $750 a year to $1500 a year in 
2020.  
 
Possible new guaranteed buyout program - version B, combined with flood insurance 
Below is a different version of the guaranteed buyout program described earlier. With this version 
of the policy, homeowners must have flood insurance to sign up, and “payment” is in the form of 
reduced flood insurance rates. 
 
For the purposes of this question, assume that you have flood insurance and if you don’t sign up 
for the program then your insurance premium will be $4000 a year 
If you do sign up for this program, it works like this: 
 You could buy flood insurance at $2000 a year for as long as the house is there (rates will 
not go up). That rate would be lower than the rate you would otherwise have to pay, and so 
saves you $2000 every year that you own your home.  
 In most ways, this insurance would provide the same benefits as the current ly available flood 
insurance program.  
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 However, you would sign a permanent legal agreement promising that if a flood damages 
your house such that half its value (or more) is lost, then you will let the government buy your 
house and you will move. 
o The government would pay the value of the house on the market before it was 
damaged. 
o Some of the required paperwork can be completed before a flood to make the 
process much faster should it be needed. The buyout would be completed in less 
than three months after a bad flood. 
 
 This arrangement gives you certainty that you will be able to sell their house for its full value 
quickly after a flood. 
 This arrangement takes away your option to rebuild your house in the same location after 
severe flood damage. 
 This arrangement helps you to be sure your insurance stays affordable.  
 
19b) Suppose such a new policy were put in place, and you were offered the chance to sign up for 
this guaranteed buyout program combined with flood insurance. Think about whether you would 
accept that agreement starting this year, considering your financial situation and the flood risk you 
face.  
Remember, in your location, updated flood maps say that we can expect a flood at least once 
every 100 years (or a 1 in 4 chance of flood over the course of a 30 year mortgage) 
 
Assume the amount of money you save each year on flood insurance by signing up for this policy 
would be $2000 per year.  
Would you sign up for the policy? 
 Yes 
 No 
       Why?:________________________________________________________________ 
 
20) With this new guaranteed buyout program in place, what percent of your neighbors do you 
think would sell their homes and move following a very damaging flood? Mark an X on the line 
below. 
 
Percent: |----------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------| 
  0           25%  50%    75%   100% 
  NONE                  Half of them   ALL 
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Part 5: Follow up questions 
 
21) Has your home ever been raised above the ground by raising its foundation, having it built 
on fill, or putting it on stilts or pilings?  Examples are: 
 
 
Figure 1 These homes have been elevated. 
 Yes  
 No  
 Don't Know  
 
22) What percent of homes in your town do you think have had flood damage in the last 20 
years? Mark an X on the line below. 
 
Percent: |----------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------| 
  0           25%  50%    75%  100% 
  NONE                  half of them   ALL 
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23) To the best of your knowledge how many flood insurance claims have you or previous 
owners made on your current home in the last 20 years? Pick one. 
 0 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4+ 
 
24) In the worst flood you have experienced, how much flood damage did your home suffer? 
Pick one. 
 None, or I have not experienced a flood 
 Less than $4000 
 $4000 - $24,999 
 $25,000 – $99,000 
 $100,000 or more 
 I don’t know 
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25) Have you made two or more flood insurance claims of at least $1,000 on your property in 
the last 10 years? Pick one. 
 Yes 
 No 
 Not sure 
 
26) Did you know that most flood insurance policies are provided by the federal government? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
27) How many people live in your home, including children?  ____ 
 
28) How many years have you lived in your town? (This includes previous homes in the same 
town)  _____ years 
 
29) Did you think about flood risk when you were deciding to live there? Pick one. 
 Yes 
 Sort of 
 No 
 
30) What is your combined annual household income?  Check one.  
 
___ Less than $20,000 
___ $20,000 to $29,999 
___ $30,000 to $39,999 
___ $40,000 to $49,999 
___ $50,000 to $59,999 
___ $60,000 to $69,999 
___ $70,000 to $79,999 
___ $80,000 to $89,999 
___ $90,000 to $99,999 
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___ $100,000 to $124,000 
___ $125,000 to $149,999 
___ $150,000 to $299,000 
___ $300,000 to $500,000 
___ $500,000 or more 
 
31) What is your age? 
o 18 to 24 
o 25 to 34  
o 35 to 44 
o 45 to 54 
o 55 to 65 
o 65 and older 
 
32) What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
o Less than high school 
o High school / GED 
o Some college 
o 2-year college degree 
o Bachelor’s degree 
o Master’s degree 
o Doctoral degree 
o Other advanced degree (such as JD or  MD) 
 
 
33) What is your gender? 
o Female 
o Male 
o ______ 
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34) What is your race? 
 
o White 
o African American 
o Hispanic/Latino 
o Asian 
o Native American 
o Pacific Islander 
o ________ 
 
35) Do you have family living in other homes in your community? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
36) How often do you talk with the people in your neighborhood? Pick one. 
 Never 
 Less than once a month 
 Once a month 
 2 or 3 times a month 
 Once a week 
 Every day 
37) What is your zip code? 
38) How worried are you that a flood could harm each of the following (check one for each):   
 Not at all A little worried Very worried Don’t know 
a) Your household finances     
b) Your emotional well-being     
c) Your physical health     
d) Your safety     
e) The future of your community     
 
39) Do you have any comments for us about this survey? 
 
THANK YOU FOR ANSWERING THE SURVEY 
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APPENDIX B 
MONTE CARLO ANALYSIS 
Supplementing the survey research, we conduct a Monte Carlo simulation to provide 
insights into the value flows from pre-flood buyout agreements to taxpayers. Homeowners pay 
flood insurance premiums, receive indemnity payments after flood damage, and incur temporary 
relocation costs during reconstruction or while searching for a new home. Taxpayers (FEMA) 
receive premiums, pay out indemnity payments, incur administrative costs, and receive use and 
non-use values from bought out properties repurposed as public spaces.  
This simulation is an abstract representation that measures and contrasts a full insurance 
policy, a subsidized flood insurance policy similar to that of some policies currently in force, and 
a subsidized insurance policy coupled with a buyout guarantee much like the program analyzed 
in the body of this paper. We calculate the net present value (NPV) of each policy for taxpayers 
while varying the levels of current flood risk, rate of flood risk increase, and premium subsidies.  
Results (Appendix Table 1) show the NPV results for a base case scenario to which we 
compare all other variant scenarios. In the second scenario we decrease the insurance subsidy 
from 50% to 20%. The third scenario increases the rate of flood risk from the base level to three 
times the base level over 100 years. The final scenario increases the overall factor of risk by a 
factor of two. The resulting NPVs provide insights to the sign of the effect on NPV from shift 
between any of the three policies.  All NPV values are averaged over 5,000 iterations of each 
scenario.  
Results show net present values for the full insurance policy are negative but around zero 
for all scenarios. We expect this to be the case as homeowners are paying the expected annual 
loss as a premium. The negative values stem from temporary relocation and administration costs.  
Taxpayers have negative net present values for the subsidized insurance policy and the 
buyout coupled with insurance. These are negative values because premiums do not fully cover 
indemnity payments. The buyout coupled with insurance does however have a higher relative net 
present value for taxpayers than the subsidized insurance policy. Taxpayer are relatively better 
off with the coupled policy under higher risk scenarios when compared to the subsidized 
insurance policy.  
In this simulation a buyout is triggered when the sum of all past and current flood claims 
are greater than 50% of the value of the home. Therefore higher flood risk scenarios trigger more 
buyouts as can be seen in the bottom of Appendix Table 1.  
These results suggest the buyout coupled with insurance reduces the financial burden on 
taxpayers relative to the subsidized insurance policy while still providing a positive net present 
value for homeowners.
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Appendix B Monte Carlo Results 
  Base case   
Increase 
insurance 
subsidy 
from 50% 
to 80%   
Increase 
risk 3x by 
year 2116   
Increase 
overall risk 
by a factor 
of 2 
Home value $100,000 
 
$100,000 
 
$100,000 
 
$100,000 
Discount rate 3% 
 
3% 
 
3% 
 
3% 
Up front admin costs: insurance $1,000 
 
$1,000 
 
$1,000 
 
$1,000 
Up front admin costs: buyout $2,000 
 
$2,000 
 
$2,000 
 
$2,000 
Insurance premium 100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
Buyout premium subsidy  50% 
 
80% 
 
50% 
 
50% 
Marginal open space benefit $9,732 
 
$9,732 
 
$9,732 
 
$9,732 
Cumulative buyout trigger 50% 
 
50% 
 
50% 
 
50% 
Flood risk factor increase Yr. 0 to 100 2 
 
2 
 
3 
 
2 
Current probability of 25% loss 1.00% 
 
1.00% 
 
1.00% 
 
2.00% 
Current probability of 50% loss 0.50% 
 
0.50% 
 
0.50% 
 
1.00% 
Current probability of 100% loss 0.50% 
 
0.50% 
 
0.50% 
 
1.00% 
Year 2116 probability of 25% loss 2.00% 
 
2.00% 
 
3.00% 
 
4.00% 
Year 2116 probability of 50% loss 1.00% 
 
1.00% 
 
1.50% 
 
2.00% 
Year 2116 probability of 100% loss 1.00% 
 
1.00% 
 
1.50% 
 
2.00% 
        
        Taxpayer                
NPV full insurance $53    ($326)   ($4,727)   ($407) 
NPV subsidized insurance ($134,941) 
 
($96,375) 
 
($206,375) 
 
($266,871) 
NPV buyout with insurance  ($91,213)   ($68,795)   ($113,813)   ($102,422) 
Taxpayer gain from buyout program vs 
subsidized insurance $43,729  
 
$27,580  
 
$92,562  
 
$164,449  
Change from base case     ($16,149)   $48,834    $120,721  
        Percentage of buyouts after 10 years 6% 
 
6% 
 
6% 
 
12% 
Percentage of buyouts after 30 years 22% 
 
22% 
 
23% 
 
43% 
Percentage of buyouts after 100 years 74%   74%   86%   97% 
